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Cong. (2011) (written testimony of Theresa C. Bertucci, Associate Director, Enterprise Services Directorate U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services). E-Verify has struggled with erroneous and obsolete entries in the databases on which it relies, together with other obstacles to good performance; we discuss these in more detail later in this paper.
4. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 Ct. (2011 .
5. Senators Reid, Durbin, Schumer, Leahy, Feinstein and Menendez described the proposed BELIEVE system on April 29, 2010, in a document initially labeled "Conceptual Proposal for Immigration Reform," available under the title "Real Enforcement with Practical Answers for Immigration Reform (REPAIR) Proposal" at www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=31851.
6. The Conceptual Proposal, supra note 5, does not specify which biometric would be encoded on the card. Knowledgeable congressional staffers, however, indicated last year that the plan contemplated the use of either fingerprints or hand vein scans. We assume the use of one of those two biometrics in this analysis. The employer must keep records of that documentation in a form called the I-9. Employers need not seek documentation from, or fill out I-9s for, people who are legally classified as independent contractors rather than employees.
The Obama Administration has greatly expanded enforcement of I-9 requirements in the past three years, sharply increasing audits (so-called "silent raids") of employers' I-9 files. In FY 2010, ICE fined employers about $7 million for I-9 violations, ten times as much as in 2008. Some targets have been small (as in one case where ICE sought to fine a small Subway franchisee over $100,000 for I-9 violations, notwithstanding that there was no evidence the business had actually hired an unauthorized worker); would have to present that card to her current employer(s), and to every future employer. The employer would use equipment on its own premises (or those of a third-party credential bureau) to check Sally's fingerprints or other biometric again, and make sure they matched those on the card. Assuming the biometrics matched, the employer would then check Sally's work authorization against the master government database. If Sally's biometric failed to match that on the card (perhaps because of a fingerprint error when the card was made), or the master database erroneously reported her as unauthorized to work, she would have to apply to the government bureaucracy to get the problem fixed before being allowed to work again.
I. ThE BELIEVE SYSTEM WOULD BE

PROhIBITIVELY COSTLY
The Social Security Administration has estimated that it will require $10 billion to create a biometric social security card, an approach similar to the BELIEVE scheme. That estimate is egregiously low. Our analysis indicates that it would cost almost $40 billion to establish the BELIEVE system (including both direct costs to the federal government and hidden costs imposed on employers and workers), and another $3 billion annually to maintain it. (See Figure 1) 7. "Conceptual Proposal," supra note 5, at 10. • authorize an adequately staffed and funded government agency to implement the ID card system;
• issue rules and regulations on methods for updating data, appealing denials of applications, and replacing lost or stolen cards;
• create the national database to which those card readers will be connected;
• distribute (or sell) card readers to 7.4 million workplaces;
• verify the identity of, and issue cards to approximately 150 million workers;
• be prepared to respond to the same number of requests for verification in the start-up period alone. 14. Our cost estimate assumes that employers with fewer than 500 employees will save money by using a third-party verification service, rather than buying biometric equipment and training employees in-house. The costs of this card-checking infrastructure will be large: Because the biometric data will be encoded on the card, the card-checking devices will need decryption capabilities. What's more, they will need to be sufficiently hardened to prevent anyone from cracking the code and extracting the biometric data, which would create a risk of biometrically-enhanced identity theft for the card holder.
In addition, businesses owning scanners would have to train employees to use them. Most workers will have to take time off work to get their cards-another real cost.
Because some information (such as name or immigration status) stored on the card could change, there will need to be a system for routinely updating information.
Because workers' cards will be lost or stolen, there will need to be a system for card replacement.
The federal government will need a system for manual verification and investigation when the automated system reports that a biometric doesn't match or that an individual isn't authorized to work. Anyone rejected for an ID card, or anyone who presents a valid card but is accused of not being the person to whom the card really belongs (say, due to an erroneous fingerprint mis-match), must have a quick and effective means of correcting the mistake.
As we will detail later, there is strong reason to expect frequent errors in each of these categories. Error correction will entail substantial costs both to the government and to workers themselves. Consider that today, when the E-Verify system gives workers a "tentative nonconfirmation" notice -a warning that government databases report they are not authorized to work-the workers need to make time in order to attempt to resolve the database error. The error correction costs of the BELIEVE program will be substantially greater than E-Verify's 15 , because BELIEVE will have to address biometric errors as well as database errors.
Under the BELIEVE plan, every biometric or database error will mean a lost job, and lost wages, until the error can be fixed and the worker employed. Even our most conservative estimates suggest that the bill for lost wages due to errors will be billions of dollars at the outset, and more than $65 million each year thereafter. We estimate that the productivity costs to employers and workers of acquiring cards, and remedying errors, for every employee in the U.S. workforce, together with the direct costs to employers for verification, will be in the range of $12 to $18 billion for the initial rollout alone. Ongoing costs will be in the neighborhood of $1 billion yearly. Multiplying that estimate by a factor of three (to reflect the fact that the UK plan was planned to cover a mere 50 million adults, one-third the size of the U.S. workforce 19 )
would yield a corresponding US estimate of $30-90 billion.
The midpoint of that range-$60 billion-is about oneeighth of total annual nondefense discretionary spending in the federal budget.
It should be noted, though, that the UK plan contemplated a much smaller reader network than the BELIEVE plan would require; in addition to having a much larger population, the land area of the United States is more than 40 times greater than that of the UK. Thus, U.S. costs for a network of verification locations would have to be substantially higher. This suggests that our own conservative estimates, summing to little more than $40 billion for the BELIEVE program's initial rollout, may significantly underestimate its costs.
II. ThE CARD WILL BE UNRELIABLE
The appeal of the BELIEVE plan is the idea that American employers will be able to consult a trouble-free, reliable, fraud-proof card that can tell them with assurance whether the person standing before them is authorized to work.
The BELIEVE plan will not do that.
a. data Quality
In issuing cards to U.S. citizens and others, the government will be relying on information derived from existing databases for its judgments as to who is authorized to work and who is not. No matter how good the security on the cards, the system results will be unreliable if government databases cannot accurately report which individuals are in fact authorized to work. The extensive inaccuracies in current DHS and SSA databases, though, are well-documented.
According to the Social Security Administration (SSA), there are errors in approximately 17.8 million records in the NUMIDENT database used to check employment eligibility status. About 13 million of those incorrect records belong to U.S. citizens. 20 A recent DHS report found that the E-Verify system had no more than 54% success in detecting unauthorized workers. 21 Anecdotal reports suggest that the system's error rate in dealing with authorized workers, while lower, is still quite high. 22 While the DHS report cheerily claims that the system finds only 0.8% of authorized workers to be unauthorized, 23 application of even that statistic to the overall U.S. workforce would mean that over a million authorized U.S. workers would incorrectly be found to be working illegally.
These error rates will likely have a disproportionate effect on legitimate foreign-born workers and the industries that tend to employ them. For example, Intel 
C. Fraud
The BELIEVE plan's biometric requirement is designed to ensure that the worker presenting an ID card to an employer is the same person to whom the card was issued.
But it does not ensure that the person applying for an ID card is using her own name, rather than a stolen or false identity. The plan does require card applicants to present identity documents such as drivers' licenses. It is likely therefore that the market in false documents will shift to providing underlying documents in a false or stolen name.
As a National Academy of Sciences report has explained, "even the most secure documents issued by the U.S. Smith than the actual one.
III. ThE BELIEVE PLAN WOULD BURDEN ThE POOR
The BELIEVE Plan will amount in the long run to a work tax: the law will impose costs (and delays) every time someone wants to take a new job. This tax will fall hardest on the poorest, and especially hard on casual labor hires, since they receive among the lowest wages, are hired for the shortest period of time and experience high job turnover.
In order to follow the law's requirements and get a card, workers will need to get their identity papers in order. But the people who least have their papers in order tend to be the poorest, most ill, or most in need of employment. The very people one would want to avoid hurting-homeless persons, for example-are the ones most likely to be harmed by a system that will in effect make them unemployable.
If the plan were to provide that day laborers, say, the creation of a card and a database that control each individual's right to work will give the government new leverage over citizens. 34. There is precedent for denying federal ID documents to people whose behavior the government wants to improve: the US Code requires the Secretary of State to refuse to issue (and, optionally, to revoke) a passport for anyone accused by a state agency of owing $2,500 or more in child support. The statute also immunizes the Secretary of State and the US Government for any liability for these actions (42 USC 652(k)(2)). Similar rules allow most states to revoke drivers or professional licenses held by "deadbeat dads." The creation of an "off" switch on the right to work opens the door to similar measures against whoever becomes the disfavored group of the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
Supporters of the BELIEVE plan would have the nation expend huge, untold sums on a new ID card requirement that would require every U.S. citizen to be subject to biometric capture and to submit to a government regulatory scheme under which widespread errors will inevitably and wrongfully deny a significant part of the U.S. population the ability to work until those errors work their way through the system. In return, we will get a system of ID cards that will still not prevent fraud, and will not end unauthorized employment; at best, it will offer criminals a new revenue stream in the provision of 
GoVErNMENt CoStS-INItIaL SEt-UP aNd Card
ISSUaNCE, YEarS 0-5
Create federal capacity to verify identities and employment eligibility.
Workers must apply to the federal government to receive a biometric card. This application must be done 
INItIaL, oNE-tIME CoStS For BELIEVE BIo-Id SYStEM Costs to the Government (in millions)
Staff training on verifying identities (train 3 staff per 4,500 offices) $67.5
Biometric hardware for passport offices $13.5 to $337.5
Expanded capacity of E-Verify system to accommodate 7.4 million U.S. businesses $1,119
National birth and death registration systems; HHS, SSA, and DHS standardize information collected and reported by states $300
Employer and public education campaigns $410 
Enhance Current Capacity to Prevent Fraud
The proposal is vague regarding enhancing fraud protection, an extremely important factor related to social security/identity cards. What agency would be in charge of fraud protection? How much would it cost that agency to hire staff and manage programs to prevent identity theft and fraud? We intentionally leave this item blank because we did not find a suitable benchmark. Leaving this cost projection blank will lead to an underestimation of total BELIEVE system costs.
random audits of Employers Who deduct Employee Wages
Again, the proposal is vague regarding its stipulation on conducting audits of employers. How much would it cost the agency to hire staff and manage programs to conduct audits? How many audits would be conducted per annum?
We intentionally leave this item blank. Leaving this cost projection blank will lead to an underestimation of total BELIEVE system costs.
Public Education Campaign
The government will need to educate over 156 million workers, along with millions of future workers, on their rights and obligations under the BELIEVE system. In addition, the campaign will need to educate 7.4 million businesses. We used the original public relations campaign budget as reported in a US GAO report for the 2010 US Census as a benchmark because the U.S. Census communications program is a large and expansive program designed to educate over 300 million people:
$410 million. 
US GAO 2009 Communications Campaign Has Potential to
Purchase of Biometric Scanners
For employers with at least 500 employees, we assume it will be more cost effective for the employer to buy biomet- In their 2002 Technology Assessment, the US GAO estimates it would cost $5,000 to train each staff person to utilize the biometric technology. As mentioned above, we assume that it will be more cost effective for large employers to have an in-house biometric card-scanner. We also assume that 18,311 businesses will average 1 staff person trained in biometric technology -some businesses will have more, but some businesses will have none and opt to use a third party business specializing in employment veri- The second phase identifies and verifies each registered traveler at the immigration checkpoint. We assume that the process and steps described here are comparable to the processes to be implemented by a third party service as part of the BELIEVE program. We assume that all employers with less than 500 employees will opt for this 
CoStS to EMPLoYErS aNd WorKErS-INItIaL
SEt-UP aNd Card ISSUaNCE, YEarS 0-5
Loss of Productivity When Workers take time off to Get Card
We assume that employed workers will have to be absent 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) average hourly wage rate
Loss of Productivity due to Errors -Current Workers
Errors When taking Biometric Measurements at U.S.
Passport offices
A 2010 US GAO report on the 2010 US Census revealed a 22% error rate in fingerprinting acquisition among trained employees. We assume that biometric technology equipment and training will improve and we estimate a very conservative 1% error rate. In addition, we estimate that these errors will result in a range of one to four weeks' missed wages because of the time and steps involved in correcting errors such as misidentification as an individual ineligible to work in the U.S. In this example, the worker will need to investigate where the error occurred (in the record-keeping of some particular office, in the scanning of the biometric markers, in the information encrypted in the biometric ID card), and one to four weeks to complete these steps is a conservative estimate. we assume that ongoing needs will be smaller. We assume that after the first 5 years, the initial large staff and budget needs will shift to lower ongoing maintenance. We assume that 1 staff person will be retained at each of 4,500 US Passport offices; this person will require updated training.
Multiply training costs ($5,000) by number of staff (4,500)
for a total cost of $ 22.5 million per year.
US GAO 2002 Technology Assessment: http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d03174 .pdf
Biometric Machine Maintenance
We earlier assumed that 4,500 U.S. passport offices would acquire three biometric machines at $1,000 -25,000 each. US GAO 2002 Technology Assessment: http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d03174 .pdf
Enhance Current Capacity to Prevent Fraud
random audits of Employers Who deduct Employee Wages
ongoing training of Employer obligations,
Workers rights
We assume that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission will be in charge of training employers and workers of their rights and obligations under the BELIEVE system. We assume the agency budget for its Education, 
New Biometric Id Cards
In Table 2 
